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  This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of strategic competition in retail 
banking when some of the financial firms are non-profit organisations that invest in social 
activities. Banking literature about competition is fairly large, but the strategic interaction 
between profit maximizing and non profit maximizers has not been extensively analysed 
except for Purroy and Salas (1999). In this paper, a completely different approach is taken. 
An adaptation of Hotelling’s two stage model of spatial competition is developed to take 
into  account  consumer  perceptions  respect  to  the  two  different  types  of  financial 
institutions.  The  empirical  analysis  confirms  that  consumers  take  into  account  other 
features different from the price, such as social contribution or closer service to make a 
deposit or mortgage decision. These conclusions are of interest in the debate about a firm’s 
social or ethical activities. It is shown that if consumers value social activities, firms can 
improve their results by behaving socially responsible.  
  Keywords: Strategic competition, Hotelling´s model, Spanish banking, Corporate social 
responsibility. 
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The Spanish banking sector is a regulated industry where three kinds of institutions, 
commercial  banks,  savings  banks  and  credit  cooperatives  compete  under  equal 
conditions in the loan, deposit and financial services market. The two main financial 
institutions: commercial banks and savings banks, which account for 95 per cent of the 
loan and deposit markets, have some distinctive features. One important difference has 
to do with the form of ownership. Commercial banks are privately owned and their 
shares are in hands of families, individual or institutional investors. On the contrary, 
savings banks have no formal owners and there is no market for its corporate control. 
Besides,  they  must  either  retain  their  earnings  or  invest  them  in social  and  cultural 
programs
1. Therefore, savings banks can be considered as “non-profit” organizations in 
the sense of Hansmann (1996) with a social contribution (Crespí et al., 2003).  
Since  savings  banks  ownership  structure  is  diffuse  managers  might  have 
effective control of the organizations. Orthodox theoretical thinking should lead to the 
conclusion  that  organizations  with  such  loose  ownership  structure  should  clearly  be 
outperformed when competing with efficient, profit maximising firms. However, this is 
not the case in the Spanish retail banking market. The erosion of commercial banks’ 
market share in favour of savings banks has occurred at the same time that the latter 
outperformed the former in profitability and solvency (Table 1). 
The  social  and  cultural  programs  of  savings  banks  account  for,  nowadays, 
around 20% of their net profits and may have two different targets. On the one hand, 
public good production (mainly cultural events), that can be socially enjoyed. On the 
other, production of services addressed to lower classes (grant programs) in order to 
reduce social wealth differences and exclusion (Valero, 2003). Although, there is a legal 
compliance with respect to these activities, regulatory provisions are vague and do not 
indicate the extent and objectives of the social investment. One would have expected a 
reduction in this quantity as solvency has been encouraged by financial authorities in 
the  last  decade.  However,  it  can  be  observed  that  the  percentage  invested  in  social 
activities has remained nearly stable (Table 2) together with an increase in the valuation 
and  recognition  of  these  social  activities  by  consumers  and  public  opinion  (CECA, 
2004). Savings banks are viewed as firms that not only care about profits but also about 
the effects of their actions on consumers and society. This is precisely the main idea of 
the  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  (CSR)  literature  and  of  a  socially  responsible 
company
2. 
                                                 
1 Around a fifth part of profits go each year to these programs although the exact percentage depends on 
laws from the Region where the savings banks was first chartered and savings banks statutes. 
2 Commercial banks are becoming to be aware of the public recognition of corporate social responsibility. 
Some of them have created foundations to attend social demands but they are in their initial stage.  
  Commercial Banks  Savings Banks 
Operating costs/assets  2.15  2.66 
Staff costs/assets  1.32  1.61 
Staff costs/operating costs  61.65  60.49 
Financial income/assets  7.62  8.05 
Intermediation 
margin/assets 
2.26  3.44 
Ordinary margin/assets  3.14  4.19 
Operating margin/assets  1.01  1.55 
ROA  0.53  1.10 
ROE  11.49  18.77 
Table 1A: Financial Data. 1990-1999 average. 
Source: Valero (2003) 
 
 




Year  Taxes  Reserves  Social Contribution 
(obra social) 
1990  28.78  48.43  22.09 
1991  24.60  54.63  18.98 
1992  23.77  58.02  17.78 
1993  24.85  54.57  20.40 
1994  22.64  58.57  18.63 
1995  24.20  57.12  18.54 
1996  24.44  55.98  19.46 
1997  23.58  56.69  19.64 
1998  22.44  57.02  20.46 
1999  22.37  57.61  19.94 
Table 2: Savings Bank Profit distribution (percentage) 
Source: Valero (2003) 
  Avg 1992-2002  2003  2004 
Deposits Commercial 
Banks 
42.74  37.10  35.62 
Deposits Savings Banks  50.77  55.19  56.60 
Credit Commercial 
Banks 
55.60  47.87  47.17 
Credit Savings Banks  40.06  46.69  47.38 
Solvency Commercial 
Banks 
0.94  0.59  0.61 
Solvency Savings Banks  0.84  0.52  0.49 The  usual  reasoning  to  incorporate  CSR  programs  is  either  to  reduce 
externalized costs or to avoid distributional conflicts (Heal (2004)). Recently, different 
strands  of  literature  have  been  concerned  with  the  effects  of  CSR.  Some  results 
emphasise  that  CSR  practices  divert  firm  resources,  increase  agency  problems  and 
affect negatively firm performance (Hellwig (2000) and Tirole (2001)). Others, on the 
contrary,  show  that  CSR  improve  financial  performance  and  the  value  of  the  firm 
(Cespa and Cestone (2002)).  
Following this debate, the objective of this paper is to offer both, a theoretical 
approach and empirical evidence on the role that social activities have on Spanish retail 
banking system. Several papers have analysed Spanish banking system from different 
perspectives. Coello (1994), Saez et al (1994) and Manzano and Sastre (1995) study 
strategic competition and product specialization respectively. Gallardo et al. (1992) and 
Sanchez  and  Sastre  (1994)  study  market  share  evolution.  Purroy  and  Salas  (1999) 
introduce an expense preference function to explain the better results of Spanish savings 
banks.  Fuentelsaz  and  Gómez  (2001)  and  Fuentelsaz  et  al  (2002)  analyse  the  entry 
effects  of  branch  deregulation.  This  work,  instead,  focus  on  the  analysis  of  CSR 
activities and their effects on performance and profitability. To do so, a Hotelling set 
up
3 (1929) is used to analyse the competitive game between commercial and savings 
banks when consumers recognise and value the social activities carried out by the latter.  
The contribution of the analysis is threefold. First, unlike previous papers that 
have concentrated on deposits, it attempts to integrate both loans and deposits in the 
theoretical and empirical analysis. Second, as far as the authors are concerned, it is the 
first time that savings banks’ social activities are introduced explicitly in the analysis. 
Third, the significance of CSR activities in the financial sector is evaluated. Previous 
empirical tests have attempted to shed some light about CSR policies’ effects, but at 
least two kinds of problems arise. First, CSR can comprise many activities and very 
different in nature making results difficult to compare and generalise. Second, some 
studies analyse firms that are offering different products, hence the results about CSR 
may be biased or simply driven by the different features of products. Spanish banking 
sector  and  particularly  the  deposits  and  mortgage  market  is  a  very  appropriate 
framework  to  overcome  these  weaknesses.  Deposits  and  Mortgages  are  quite 
homogeneous products that are offered by commercial and savings banks that although 
have  different  networks  compete  in  equal  terms  (Coello  (1994)).  Furthermore, 
information about savings banks’ CSR activities allows to distinguish between CSR 
practices that are different in nature and objectives, such as environmental initiatives or 
schooling grants making a more accurate and thorough analysis possible
4. 
The paper is organized as follows, section two deals with the model, and section 
three presents the results from the strategic competition process. In section four the data 
is presented and the empirical analysis is carried out. Finally section 5 offers some 
conclusions. 
 
                                                 
3  Matutes  and  Vives  (1995)  also  apply  this  setting  to  banking  industry,  although  they  only  include 
depositors.  
4 Corporate governance issues are not included. 2. Basic Model 
 
2.1. Structure of the Economy 
 
A Hotelling set up (1929) is considered, that is, it is assumed a linear city of length 1 
with a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed with density equal one, applied to 
the analysis of the banking system
5. Each consumer has one unit of cash, which must be 
deposited in a bank. Accordingly, consumers are both depositors and borrowers with an 
inelastic credit demand L as in Ciappori et al (1995). There are two banks located along 
the line at a and b, where a is the distance between point 0 and savings bank’s location, 
and b, the distance between point 1 and commercial bank’s location ( 0 , 0 ≥ ≥ b a and 
0 1 ≥ − − b a ). It is assumed that consumers incur in quadratic transportation costs when 
they  either deposit or borrow money  from the  banks, and that these costs could be 
different for each product
6. These transport costs need not be interpreted as the cost of 
time spent “travelling” to the bank. Financial institutions can be differentiated because 
they provide different financial services, Matutes and Vives (1995).   
Apart  from  objective  differences  of  financial  institutions,  consumers  have 
personal perceptions of each of the financial institutions that compete in the market. In 
particular, savings banks, partly as a result of the valuation and recognition of their 
social activities, enjoy a higher public image than commercial banks (CECA, 2004). To 
include this feature in the model it is assumed that consumers positively value these 
CSR  activities  of  savings  banks.  Besides  this  positive  valuation  by  consumers,  a 
parameter, P, will stand for the size or amount of these activities.  
Customers,  then,  have  sensitivity  to  this  activity  that  is  measured  by  θ. 
Therefore, the total net utility of a typical consumer (depositor-borrower) can be written 
as: 
 
  P x L r x r U L L D D θ β α + − + − − + =
2 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 (             (1) 
 
where xD (resp. xL) is the distance from the bank where the consumer’s cash has been 
deposited (resp. where the consumer’s loan has been granted), rD (resp. rL) is the interest 
on deposits (resp. the loan rate), α (resp. β) is the transportation cost parameter for 
deposits (resp. loans), L is the inelastic credit demand (it is assumed that L < 1). Finally, 
as said above, θ is consumer’s sensibility to CSR behaviour and P is the size of this 
behaviour.  
Financial  institutions  can  be  of  two  types,  commercial  banks  that  maximize 
profits without any CSR behaviour and savings banks that maximize profits with the 
constraint of investing an amount P in CSR operations
7. The objective function of each 
is: 
                                                 
5 For a thorough analysis see Freixas and Tirole (1998). 
6 Deposit and credit markets are considered as separate markets. 
7 Therefore θ will be 0 for commercial banks and greater than 0 for savings banks. Although commercial 
banks are starting to have foundations to include this social responsibility behaviour it takes time for  
Savings:   ( ) ( ) P F r r L D r r D
L L D D − − − + − = 1 1 1 1 1 π  
Commercial:   ( ) ( ) F r r L D r r D
L L D D − − + − = 2 2 2 2 2 π                  (2) 
 
where 
D D1 (resp. 
D D





2 ) is the loan demand for savings (resp. commercial) bank, 
L r 1  (resp. 
L r2 ) is the loan rate of savings (resp. commercial) bank, 
D r 1  (resp. 
D r2 ) is the deposit rate 
of savings (resp. commercial) bank, r is the constant return of a riskless investment 
technology (a security) and F is the fixed cost of establishing the branch.  
There are two periods. At period 1 financial institutions make a simultaneous 
decision on their competitive location. Given those locations, at period 2, institutions 
compete in prices, that is, they simultaneously set deposit and loan rates in the market.  
The maximization problem of banks is solved by backward induction: given a 
location, prices in both markets are set to maximize profits. Once the optimum values 
are known, the location is set to maximize profits given those optimum prices. 
 
 
2.2. Equilibrium without Non-Profit Behaviour  
 
As a benchmark case, it is useful to analyse the case of banks when there is no CSR 
behaviour, that is P = 0, or when consumers do not value this behaviour, P could be 
greater than 0 but θ = 0. The main results are the following
8: 
 
•  Both banks locate in the extremes of the line. Savings bank with a = 0 and 
commercial Bank with b = 0. They opt for the maximum differentiation.  
•  Loan and deposit rates are the same for both banks. 
•  Market shares are also the same, so 1/2 for each. 
•  Profits are also the same if there is no CSR behaviour, P = 0.  
•  If P was greater than 0 and consumers did not pay attention to this behaviour, 




3. Equilibrium with CSR Behaviour and Consumer Sensitivity 
 
In  the  basic  model,  competitive  variables  in  the  absence  of  CSR  behaviour,  or  if 
consumers do not value it, are mainly the same for both types of banks. These results 
may change when consumers value the CSR activities developed by savings banks. It is 
                                                                                                                                               
consumer to recognise and value this behaviour. Besides, the amount of the contributions made by the 
two biggest commercial banks in 2004 is lower than 10% of savings banks’. 
8 These results derive from Hotelling (1929) as they are presented in Tirole (1988).  assumed  that  individuals  have  private  benefits  from  them,  therefore,  they  may  be 
willing to travel further to be a customer of a savings bank. These private benefits might 
compensate the higher transportation costs
9. 
To calculate demand for each bank, the identification of the consumer that is 
indifferent between going to any of the two financial institutions is needed. Given point 
a, that is the distance between point 0 and savings bank’s location, and b, the distance 
between point 1 and commercial bank’s location, the indifferent consumer for deposit 
and loan market is respectively: 
 







L x b L r a x P L r − − + = − + − α α θ    




D r x b P r a x 2
2
1
2 1 − − − = − − − β θ β                             (3) 
 
The main change of these two equations with respect to the previous model is 
that consumers value the CSR behaviour of savings institutions and take it into account 
when deciding which bank they choose (left part). Commercial banks on the contrary do 
not have this feature and therefore the variables considered by individuals in making 
their decision is equal to the basic model (right part). From these equations credit and 
deposit demand for each bank can be calculated: 
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The existence of the CSR component affects not only savings banks but the 
credit and deposit demand of both institutions. These demands are the same as the ones 
in the basic model but for the presence of the private benefits of consumers. With these 
demand functions and given locations a and b, the maximization problem that each kind 
of bank faces to determine the optimum prices is given by: 
 
                                                 
9 The model can be easily generalized to include RSC activities of commercial banks. In this case there 
would be a positive sensitivity for commercial banks and P>0. If this was the case the results of the model 
would hold assuming that the private benefits from being a customer of a commercial bank are lower than 
savings’ banks. This is a reasonable assumption since commercial banks are now starting to have these 
RSC  activities  and  the  amount  invested  is  still  very  low  compared  with  that  of  savings  banks  (see 
footnote 8) Savings:      ( ) ( ) P F r r D L r r D Max
D D L L
r r
L D − − − − − = 1 1 1 1 1
,
       
1 1
π  
Commercial:     ( ) ( ) F r r D L r r D Max
D D L L
r r
L D − − − − = 2 2 2 2 2
,
       
2 2
π              (5) 
 
From  the  first  order  conditions  there  are  two  systems  of  equations  for  each 
market whose unique solution for each rate is: 
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Again, consumers’ sensitivity affects both savings and commercial banks in their 
optimal pricing behaviour. Once the optimum prices, given demand for each market, are 
known, the maximization problem to determine the optimum location for both kinds of 
bank can be written as: 
 
Savings:   ( ) ( ) ( ) P F r r D L r r D a r r Max
D D L L L D
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Commercial:   ( ) ( ) ( ) F r r D L r r D b r r Max
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2 2 , ,        π               (7) 
 
Attending to the above  equations and the solution to this last problem  some 
results can be obtained relating location, rates on deposit and credit market, demand and 
profits for each kind of institution. 
 
Proposition 1: In the presence of non-profit behaviour positively valued by consumers, 
•  The optimum location for commercial banks is b = 0 
•  The optimum location of savings banks depends on the relationship between 
transportation cost, both for credit and deposit market, and the private benefit of 
being a customer of a bank with CSR behaviour. 
 
Proof. See appendix. 
 
CSR  behaviour  of  savings  banks  does  not  affect  the  competitive  location  of 
commercial  banks.  Their  decision  is  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  not  having  these 
practices  or  if  consumers  do  not  value  them.  However,  savings  banks  change  their 
decision when consumer values CSR activities. Their final location is dependant on the relationship between the cost of going to the bank and the private benefit of becoming a 
customer  of  these  institutions.  Therefore,  with  the  introduction  of  the  sensibility  of 
consumers  to  these  CSR  activities,  the  competitive  location  of  savings  banks  could 
change under some conditions on the related parameters. Having these locations in mind 
it is useful to know if the rest of the competitive results can be affected.  
 
Proposition 2: In the presence of CSR behaviour positively valued by consumers, the 
loan  rate  and  deposit  rate  of  savings  banks  is  respectively  bigger  and  smaller  than 
commercial banks’. Therefore their intermediation margin is greater. 
 
Proof. See appendix. 
 
  Savings banks make good use of the valuation of CSR behaviour by consumers 
and are able to charge a higher rate on their loans and pay a lower rate on their deposits 
than commercial banks do. This better intermediation margin helps them recover part of 
the  investment  in  CSR practices.  This  result  is  independent  of  the  final  location  of 
savings banks. Given this difference in the rates offered to customers it is interesting to 
know the effect on final demand of each bank both for loans and deposits. 
 
Proposition  3:  In  the  presence  of  CSR  behaviour  positively  valued  by  consumers, 
demand  for  savings  banks,  both  in  the  deposit  and  loan  market,  is  greater  than 
commercial banks’. 
 
Proof. See appendix. 
 
  The valuation of CSR practices by consumers allows savings banks not only to 
offer higher loan rates and lower deposit rates in the market but also to have a bigger 
demand than commercial banks. This greater market share result is also independent of 
the  final  location  of  savings  banks.  These  theoretical  results  suggest  that  CSR 
investments of savings banks can help in explaining their gain in market share in the 
Spanish financial markets in the last years. The effects on performance are treated in the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: In the presence of CSR behaviour positively valued by consumers, the 
comparison of profits of savings and commercial banks depends on the relationship 
between the earnings from deposit and loan intermediation, that are higher for savings 
banks, and the cost the CSR activities of the former. 
 
Proof. See appendix. 
 
  Profits  for  savings  banks  would  be  greater  than  that  of  commercial  banks  if 
earnings  from  loan  and  credit  market,  that  derive  from  propositions  2  and  3,  were 
sufficiently high to cover the costs of CSR activities. The final sign of this result clearly 
depends on the relationship between the cost of going to the bank, the private benefit for consumers  that  become  customers  of  savings  institutions  and  the  cost  of  this  CSR 
behaviour.  
 
     
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1. Data and methodology 
 
Spanish banking system is an interesting setting to test the implications of the model 
and to analyse the relevance of CSR policies in consumers’ decisions. In particular, data 
on  mortgage  loans  and  deposits  is  collected.  These  markets  are  considered  very 
appropriate because there are no relevant differences between the mortgage loans and 
deposits offered by banks and savings banks. Therefore, as commercial and savings 
banks’ products are close substitutes we are able to test the relevance of CSR policies 
on  consumer  decisions.  Data  are  collected  from  the  Bank  of  Spain,  the  National 
Statistical Office (INE)  and the Spanish Federation of Savings  Banks  (CECA). The 
period of analysis is 1999-2004. This is the period in which data is available on CSR 
practices by savings banks and on deposits and mortgages granted by both institutions. 
In the case of CSR, disaggregated information by types of interventions can be also 
obtained. In particular, about cultural activities: sponsorship of conferences, expositions 
or museums and the like. Activities related to health (financing new facilities to elderly 
people), education and research and development, through grant fellowship programs, 
and leisure. Heritage and environment are also part of these CSR investments.  
Following the model, some features of the banking system are introduced. First, 
the number of branch offices and the number of employees. These variables reflect the 
fact that the capacity and proximity of the different credit institutions is considered 
relevant to make a mortgage or deposit decision and are a proxy of the service paid to 
clients. Second, the interest rate
10. Since products offered by commercial and savings 
banks  are  close  substitutes,  price  is  one  of  the  main  variables  of  the  competition 
between savings and commercial banks. Traditionally savings banks were oriented to 
small  clients  and  commercial  banks  to  larger  clients  and  firms.  However,  empirical 
papers show that this different orientation has disappeared and that both institutions 
compete  in  equal  terms,  Coello  (1994).  Per  capita  income  is  also  included  in  the 
estimation as economic level could affect the credit and deposit decision as well. All 
this data is available for province level.  
  The dependent variable, mortgages or deposits, and the variables on banking 
system, interest rate, branches and employees are introduced as the difference between 
commercial  and  savings  banks.  Since  CSR  information  is  available  for  individual 
savings  banks,  a  weighted  province  average  of  both  the  amount  invested  and  the 
number of interventions is constructed taking into account the population attended by 
                                                 
10 Since nominal interest rate per province is not available, a calculation of the real interest rate is used. each savings bank
11 and the province population.  Table 3 presents variable definitions 
and computations and table 4 reports summary statistics. A first analysis of data brings 
about some interesting evidence.  
  First, savings banks’ interest rates of mortgages and deposits are respectively 
higher and lower than commercial banks’. Secondly, savings banks present a higher 
number  of  branch  offices  per  province,  but  with  a  lower  number  of  employees. 
Therefore, the services to consumers by savings banks are managed through a more 
extensive branch network and with smaller agencies. From the information available 
about social activities, it can be observed that culture is the first segment in investment, 
50% more than the investment in health activities which is the second item in relevance. 
Leisure activities and heritage and environment account around 15% of obra social. 
Table 5 presents variable correlations.   
  Taking into account the model and data availability, the empirical equations to 
estimate are: 
 
Mortgage it = β0 + β1 Interest rateit + β2Branchesit +β3 Employeesit +  
β4CSR activitiesit + β5GDPpercapit + ν it     
 
Deposits it = β0 + β1 Interest rateit + β2Branchesit +β3 Employeesit +  
β4CSR activitiesit + β5GDPpercapit + ν it                   (8) 
 
Where i indicates that the variable refers to the i-th province. 
This  equation  has  been  estimated  by  panel  data  methodology.  Unlike  cross-
sectional analysis, panel data methodology has  a great advantage, since it allows to 
control for individual heterogeneity and, consequently, to eliminate the risk of obtaining 
biased results. Individual effects can be considered fixed or random. The fixed effects 
model is simply analyzed conditionally on the effects present in the observed sample, 
but  there  is  no  reason  to  consider  individual  effects  as  uncorrelated  with  the  other 
regressors, as it is assumed in the random effects model. The random effects treatment, 
therefore, may suffer from the inconsistency due to omitted variables. Hausman test 
tests the hypothesis that the random effect estimator is consistent, because individual 
effects  are  correlated  with  the  explicative  variables.  When  correlation  is  present, 
conditional inference must be done (fixed effect estimation) [Arellano y Bover, 1990]. 
Besides heterogeneity, endogeneity of explanatory variables may also affect results. In 
fact,  interest  rates  and  branches  network  are  endogenous  according  to  the  model. 
Moreover, it is hard to assume the strict exogeneity of the CSR variable. A possible 
solution is to use instrumental variable estimation (IV) introducing lagged values of 
endogenous variables as instruments. Another solution is to control for the potential 
endogeneity  of  all  the  explanatory  variables  through  the  GMM  methodology.  This 
                                                 
11 For calculating the total population attended by savings banks, we take into account the population of 
those provinces where savings banks invest in social activities. Although after the deregulation process, 
savings banks have expanded the branch network nationwide, their presence is still concentrated in their 
original territory, where they are required to make social investments. It was not until 2004 that savings 
banks are required to invest in all the territories where they have branches.    strategy consists of obtaining additional instruments using the orthogonality conditions 
that exist between lagged values of the right-hand side variables. 
 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Difdepos  Difference in deposits amount between 
savings and commercial banks, euro 
billions 
Bank of Spain 
DifMor  Difference in mortgage amount granted 
by savings and commercial banks, euro 
billions.  




Difference in the real interest rate paid 
on deposits by commercial and savings 
banks. Basis points 





Difference in the real interest rate 
charged by commercial and savings 
banks. Basis points 
Bank of Spain 
and own 
computations  
Difbranch  Difference in number of branch offices 
per province between commercial and 
savings banks 
Bank of Spain 
Diffempl  Difference in number of employees per 
province between commercial and 
savings banks 
Bank of Spain 
and own 
computations 
Income  Per capita income per province, euro 
thousands 
INE 
PopCSR   Amount of funds allocated to social 
activities per province, euro millions 
CECA and own 
computations 
PopnCSRl   Number of activities of obra social per 
province 
CECA and own 
computations 
Popcult  Amount of funds allocated to cultural 
activities per province, euro millions 
CECA and own 
computations 
Popleisure  Amount of funds allocated to leisure 
activities per province, euro millions 
CECA and own 
computations 
Pophealth  Amount of funds allocated to health 
activities per province, euro millions 
CECA and own 
computations 
Popedurd  Amount of funds allocated to 
education and R+D activities per 
province, euro millions 
CECA and own 
computations 
Popheritenviron  Amount of funds allocated to heritage 
and environment activities per 
province, euro millions 
CECA and own 
computations 
Table 3: Main Variables  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Difdepos  300  1.3373  8.7485  -59.2819     45.4227 
DifMor  300  0.2341  0.4786  -1.2834     4.3840 
Difdepireal 
 
300  -8.486  2.405  -13.52397    -3.44558 
Difmorireal 
 
300  20.69  7.36  10.87785    32.14888 
Difbranch  300  101.2033  272.401  -648        2132 
Diffempl  300  -229.803  1377.791  -9398.825    7329.252 
Income  300  15.78514               3.7586  8.662     26.80512 
PopCSR  300  20.17542  31.479  .6192216    210.9178 
PopnCSR   300  24.73912  33.612  0     224.7919 
Popcult  300  7.679825  12.834  .2240918    98.20525 
Popleisure  300  1.648104  2.4255  0  18.9956 
Pophealth  300  5.354802  10.4011  .0851     68.98449 
Popedurd  300  3.799948  5.9685  .0819388     44.483 
Popheritenviron  300  1.716086  3.0122  0  20.71931 





Table 5: Correlations 





  Dfdepir  Dfmorir  Difbran  Difemp  Income  PpCSR  PnCSR 
Dfdepir  1.000             
Dfmorir  0.2756*  1.000           
Dfbran  0.0315  -0.0547  1.000         
Difemp  0.0071  -0.0648  0.7503*  1.000       
Income  0.0448  -0.1749*  0.2051*  0.1327  1.000     
PopCSR  0.0683  -0.0280  0.6678*  0.0794  0.2675*  1.000   
PopnCSR  -0.0206  0.0025  0.6638*  0.3344*  0.2715*  0.7037*  1.000 In the estimation of the model, the results of all methods above explained are 
presented. First, all variables are considered strictly exogenous, second, IV estimation is 
implemented
12 and finally, GMM estimation is reported. Following Arellano and Bond 
(1991), all the right-hand side variables in the model lagged twice or more are used as 
instruments. In this case, to check for potential misspecification of the model the Sargan 
statistic  of  over-identifying  restrictions,  which  tests  for  the  absence  of  correlation 
between the instruments and the error term is reported. Furthermore, the AR(1) and 






Results are collected in table 6: 6A for deposits and 6B for mortgages. The first three 
columns report the results for the total amount of CSR practices and the last three for 
the number of CSR interventions with the three different estimation techniques.  
  In the case of deposits, the difference in real interest rate does not affect the 
distribution  between  commercial  and  savings  banks.  Therefore,  demand  on  deposits 
from savings and commercial banks would be inelastic to its price, the interest rate. The 
effect  of  the  size  of  commercial  network  (number  of  branches)  and  the  number  of 
employees  proxy  the  service  level  of  banks.  Commercial  network’s  coefficient  is 
significant and negative whereas the number of employees has a positive and significant 
sign  in  two  of  the  three  models.  Therefore,  the  greater  the  difference  between  the 
number of employees of savings banks and those of commercial banks’ and the lower 
the number of branches, the greater the amount of deposits of savings banks relative to 
commercial  banks’.  This  result  could  support  the  strategy  of  reducing  commercial 
network followed by commercial banks. However these relationships have to be taken 
cautiously. The sign of coefficients changes when GMM estimation is used and they are 
not significant, more in line with the strategy of greater commercial network followed 
by savings banks.  
  Per capita income is not statistically significant. On the contrary, the amount of 
obra social of savings  banks plays  a positive  and significant  role in the amount of 
deposits of savings banks with respect to commercial banks. The greater the amount 
dedicated to these investments the greater the difference in favour of savings banks 
(columns  1  to  3).  This  feature,  that  has  to  do  with  the  social  commitment  and 
responsibility of savings banks helps to explain the difference in market share with 
respect  to  commercial  banks.  This  is  not  the  case  if  the  number  of  interventions  is 
considered  (columns  4  to  6).  In  the  deposit  market,  consumers  value  the  amount 
invested  in  these  activities  but  do  not  care  about  how,  number  of  activities,  these 
interventions  are  carried  out.  Therefore,  consumers  take  into  account  the  amount 
invested in CSR practices to make a decision on where to have their deposits.  
                                                 
12 In particular, lagged values t-1 and t-2 are introduced as instruments for the interest rate, number of 
branches and CSR policies.     
Table 6A: Empirical evidence. Deposits 
Note: Dependent variable is the difference in the quantity of deposits between savings and commercial 
banks. Income accounts for the per capita income. Difdepireal is the difference in real interest rate of 
deposits.  Difbranch  is  the  difference  in  number  of  branches.  Difempl,  difference  in  the  number  of 
employees. PopCSR and PopnCSR is the amount invested and the number of activities respectively by 
savings banks 
Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. * , **, *** indicates significance 
at  the  1%,  5%  and  10%  level.  AR(i)  is  a  serial  correlation  test  of  order  i  using  residuals  in  first 
differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
 
  In  the  case  of  mortgages  (table  6B),  the  coefficient  of  the  difference  in  real 
interest  rate  is  not  significant.  Hence  differences  in  interest  rate  do  not  affect 
significantly mortgage or deposit decisions. This result relates to proposition 2 of the 
model. Consumers would care less about the loan price or the return on deposits and 
this would not affect significantly savings bank market share (proposition 3). The effect 
of the size of commercial network (number of branches) and the number of employees 
is significant but with the opposite sign found for deposits. The effect of commercial 
network is positive whereas the number of employees is negative. Therefore, the greater 
the difference between the number of branches and the lower the number of employees 
of savings banks and those of commercial banks’ the greater the amount of mortgages 
granted by savings banks relative to commercial banks’. That is, consumers prefer to 
have more branches with fewer employees. This result, that supports the strategy of a 
greater commercial network followed by savings banks, is part of the conclusions of the 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Panel  IV  GMM  panel  IV  GMM 
  difdep  Difdep  difdep  difdep  difdep  difdep 
Income  0.02625  -0.0329  -0.1036     0.00167  0.1004  0.0018     
  [0.06053]  [0.0957]  [0.2045]  [0.0573]  [0.0923]  [0.1040] 
difdepireal  -1.9423  -0.9848  0.6057     0.0613  0.2976  0.7178    
  [1.4260]  [1.2628]  [1.0313]  [0.1411]  [0.6386]  [0.9697] 
Difbranch  -0.3642**  -1.058***  0.1604     -0.678***  -0.5460*  0.4814    
  [0.0553]  [0.2257]  [0.4405]  [0.1192]  [0.3021]  [0.4901] 
Difempl  0.0578***  0.1519***  -0.0240  0.1175***  0.0975**  -0.0381    
  [0.0087]  [0.0280]  [0.0651]  [0.0213]  [0.0490]  [0.0555] 
PopCSR  0.1255***  0.3937***  0.2388***       
  [0.0253]  [0.1018]  [0.0838]       
PopnCSR        0.0048  -0.0637  -0.0155    
        [0.0108]  [0.1041]  [0.0185] 
Observs.  300  250  250  300  250  250 
Hausman 
test 
4.16  2.18       17.84*  66.44***   
Sargan test    0.615    19.82       1.539    27.88    
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
    2.44* 
0.02   
    1.65  
1.31    model. It was claimed that other characteristics different from the credit price could be 
behind the better results of savings banks. Furthermore, this result seems more robust 
than that obtained for deposits since it maintains with independence of the estimation 
method. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Panel  IV  GMM  panel  IV  GMM 
  Difmor  difmor  difmor  difmor  difmor  difmor 
Income  0.0164**  0.0232**  0.0482***  0.01327*  0.0089  0.0237 
  [0.0069]  [0.0117]  [0.0178]  [0.0068]  [0.0131]  [0.0163] 
difmorireal  -0.1408  0.5561  -0.1449  -0.1862  0.0483  0.0957 
  [0.2072]  [1.3861]  [0.5903]  [0.2047]  [1.5196]  [0.4963] 
Difbranch  0.0137***  0.1273***  0.0619**  0.0116***  0.0825*  0.0719*** 
  [0.0038]  [0.0440]  [0.0297]  [0.0019]  [0.0476]  [0.0264] 
Difemplo  -0.0005  -
0.0201*** 
-0.0105*  -0.0004  -0.0137*  -
0.0120*** 
  [0.0005]  [0.0074]  [0.0059]  [0.0003]  [0.0079]  [0.0044] 
PopCSR  0.00069  -0.0052  -0.0004       
  [0.0021]  [0.0012]  [0.0049]       
PopnCSR        0.0029***  0.0182**  0.0073*** 
        [0.0010]  [0.0073]  [0.0019] 
Observs.  300  250  250  300  250  250 
Hausman 
test 
12.59  13.88***    8.19  10.30**   
Sargan test    1.159  43.09    2.534  45.16 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
    -1.26 
-0.91 
    -1.23 
-0.56 
Table 6B: Empirical evidence. Mortgages 
Note: Dependent variable is the difference in the quantity of mortgages granted between savings and 
commercial  banks.  Income  accounts  for  the  per  capita  income.  Difmorireal  is  the  difference  in  real 
interest rate of mortgages. Difbranch is the difference in number of branches. Difempl, difference in the 
number  of  employees.  PopCSR  and  PopnCSR  is  the  amount  invested  and  the  number  of  activities 
respectively by savings banks  
Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. * , **, *** indicates significance 
at  the  1%,    5%  and  10%  level.  AR(i)  is  a  serial  correlation  test  of  order  i  using  residuals  in  first 
differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  
   
Per  capita  income  is  statistically  significant  and  positive  only  for  some 
estimations. With respect to CSR, the number of activities of savings banks plays a 
positive  and  significant  role  in  the  amount  of  mortgages  granted  with  respect  to 
commercial banks. The greater is the number of interventions, the greater the difference 
in favour of savings banks (columns 4 to 6). This is not the case if the amount of 
investment is considered (columns 1 to 3). In the mortgage market then, consumers 
value more the number of social interventions than the global amount invested. Again, 
consumers take into account CSR practices to make a mortgage decision. This  result, both for deposits and mortgages, was in some way predicted by the model. Although 
savings  banks  usually  charge  a  greater  interest  rate  in  mortgages  and  pay  a  lower 
interest  rate  in  deposits  (proposition  2),  they  end  up  with  a  greater  market  share 
(proposition 3) reducing the importance of price in consumer decision making. 
  A simultaneous estimation of both markets, deposits and mortgages, is presented 
in  table  7
13.  Results  confirm  the  relevance  of  social  activities  of  savings  banks  in 
explaining  the  difference  in  market  share  with  commercial  banks.  The  greater  the 
number of interventions the greater the difference in favour of savings banks both for 
deposits and for mortgages. The amount invested in social contributions is also positive 
for both markets but not significant. 
 
  Amount  Number of Activities 
  difmor  difdepos  Difmor  difdepos 
Pibperca  0.0168***  0.2386**  13.2402**  0.1093         
  [0.0063]  [0.1068]  [6.5787]  [0.1149] 
Difireal  -1.5483      1.4731        -2.1936         2.9693   
  [1.2410]  [1.6599]  [1.4985]  [1.9695] 
Difbranch  0.0095***  -0.1857***  0.0099***  -0.2283*** 
  [0.0031]  [0.0535]  [0.0027]  [0.0439] 
Difempl  0.0002     0.0792***  -0.0001         0.0768*** 
  [0.0004]  [0.0077]  [0.0003]  [0.0048] 
popCSR  0.0025     0.0439        
  [0.0018]  [0.0305]     
popnCSRl      0.0031**  0.0969*** 
      [0.0016]  [0.0258] 
R  0.59  0.64  0.58  0.62 
Observations  250  250  250  250 
Table 7: Simultaneous Estimation of Deposits and Mortgages 
Note: Dependent variable is the difference in the quantity of mortgages (deposits) between savings and 
commercial banks. Income accounts for the per capita income. Difireal is the difference in real interest 
rate of mortgages (deposits). Difbranch is the difference in number of branches. Difempl, difference in 
the number of employees. PopCSR and PopnCSR is the amount invested and the number of activities 
respectively by savings banks. Standard errors are in brackets.***, **, * show significant effects at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
 
  Finally, in table 8, the analysis is repeated for the different features of social 
activities performed by savings banks
14. It distinguishes among those related to health, 
culture, education and research and development, leisure, heritage and environment. In 
the case of deposits, the breaking up of social activities shows interesting results.  
 
                                                 
13 In this estimation, interest rate, branches, employees and CSR activities are considered endogenous and 
instrumented by lagged values.  
14 This analysis is carried out for the amount invested in social activities due to the lack of disaggregated 

























































36.67  38.76 
AR(1)  -0.95  -1.38 
AR(2)  -1.04  -1.48 
Table 8: Items of CSR. Deposits and Mortgages. GMM estimation 
Note: Dependent variable is the difference in the quantity of mortgages (deposits) between savings and 
commercial banks. Income accounts for the per capita income. Difireal is the difference in real interest 
rate of mortgages (deposits). Difbranch is the difference in number of branches. Difempl, difference in 
the  number  of  employees.  Popleisure,  popedurd,  pophealth,  popheritenvir  is  the  amount  invested  in 
leisure,  education  and  R+D,  health  and  heritage  and  environment  respectively  by  savings  banks.          
Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. * , **, *** indicates significance 
at  the  1%,    5%  and  10%  level.  AR(i)  is  a  serial  correlation  test  of  order  i  using  residuals  in  first 
differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
 
  Consumers  value  preferably  activities  that  have  to  do  with  culture,  leisure, 
heritage and environment. In a sense, this kind of interventions could be considered 
both as more related to individual benefits (culture and leisure) and to more general and 
social needs (heritage and environment). Therefore, customers prefer expenses that, on 
the one hand mean more private benefits and are related to their current needs and on 
the other hand those that are devoted to more general objectives. In fact, the significant 
coefficient  of  environment  reflects  the  growing  interest  of  consumers  evidenced  in 
increasing activism through NGO and recent public surveys, (CECA, 2004). On the 
other hand, health activities have no effect on the decision to take a loan with a savings 
or a commercial bank. Although, the coefficient is positive, meaning that consumers 
value  these  activities,  it  has  no  statistical  significance  on  their  decision.  Finally, 
education  and  R+D  have  a  negative  and  significant  sign.  That  is,  consumers  value negatively the investments of savings banks in these activities. This result is relevant 
since Education and R+D is the second item that receives more investment. In the case 
of  mortgages  only  cultural  activities,  the  most  important  item,  have  a  positive  and 
significant sign even though the global amount of social contribution (table 6B, columns 
1 to 3) was not significant.  
  Therefore, as said above, consumers take into account other features different 
from the price to make a decision on having their mortgage and deposits with a savings 
bank. These features can be identified as a closer commercial network and service level 
and the social intervention of these institutions. These results help to explain the recent 





The  characteristics  and  recent  evolution  of  Spanish  banking  sector  is  the  empirical 
motivation of the paper. Spanish commercial banks compete with savings banks, but 
they differ in their objective function. Savings banks have a wider objective function 
derived  from  their  particular  origins  consisting  of  social  programs  and  a  strong 
commitment with the territory where they operate. The question tackled in the paper is 
whether the specific objective function of savings banks may affect banking market 
competition. Savings banks have attracted much attention in the literature, but as far as 
the authors know, the formalisation of the consumer perception of CSR practices has 
not been introduced.  
The results of the paper show that the introduction of this positive valuation by 
customers affects the competition between both banking institutions with respect to the 
rates charged in the loan market, interests paid in the deposit market, market shares, 
competitive location and profits. In particular, savings institutions are able to charge 
greater rates on loans offered to customers, pay lower interest rates on deposits and 
enjoy a greater market share than commercial banks do in both markets. The effects on 
competitive location of savings banks depend on the relationship between the costs of 
going to the bank (to get a loan or have a deposit) and the private benefit from CSR 
activities for consumers of becoming a customer of these institutions. As far as profits is 
concerned, commercial banks would have greater profits whenever the cost of CSR 
activities overcomes the extra earnings obtained in the market interaction.  
  The empirical analysis confirms the conclusions from the theoretical model. It is 
shown that consumers take into account other features different from the price to make a 
decision on having their mortgage and deposits with a savings bank. These features can 
be summarised as a closer commercial network and service level, related to the number 
of branches and employees, and the social intervention of these institutions. In a more 
disaggregated analysis of the CSR contribution, it is found that customers value equally 
activities that could have a direct impact on their wellbeing (culture and leisure) and 
others that could be viewed as more general with features of public good (heritage and 
environment). These conclusions are of interest in the debate about a firm’s social or ethical activities. It is shown that if consumers value CSR activities, firms may improve 




The envelope theorem is used to obtain the first order condition of the optimum location 
for each bank. 
Commercial Bank:    
F r r D L r r D b r r Max
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θ α          (9) 
The  difference  between  r  and  each  interest  rate  is  positive,  then  the  above 
expression  is  negative.  This  means  that  commercial  banks  want  to  go  as  further  as 
possible to the right, therefore they will be at b = 0. 
 
Savings Bank: 
   P F r r D L r r D a r r Max
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θ α        (10) 
Given that b = 0, optimum location of savings banks depend on the relationship 
between the private benefit for consumers of the CSR activity and the costs of going to 
a bank to get a loan or have a deposit. 
 
Proposition 2 
Loan rate, we want to prove that  0 2 1 > −
L L r r , 
( ) ( )
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This expression is positive since b = 0 and a is non-negative. 
 
Deposit rate, we want to prove that  0 2 1 < −
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                 (12) 
This expression is negative since b = 0 and a is non-negative. 
Therefore the intermediation margin is greater. 
 
Proposition 3 
Demand for loans, we want to prove that  0 2 1 > −
L L D D  
( ) ( )





a b b a
b a
P b a b a
b
b a

































1 6 3 2
1












                                                          
(13) 
This expression is positive since b = 0 and a is non-negative. 
 
Demand for deposits, we want to prove that  0 2 1 > −
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(14) 
This expression is positive since b = 0 and a is non-negative. 
 
Proposition 4 
To prove proposition 4 simply note that with a greater intermediation margin and a 
greater demand the profit from market activity is higher for savings banks. The sign of 
the overall profit will clearly depend on the relationship between this greater market 
profit and the amount of the CSR activities. References 
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